that it is one of the missions of the humanities to preserve and interpret. If, despite the present hard times, these societies remain healthy, this may depend on more than politics, economics, and technology. In short, I want to propose a kind of attack into the home waters of the humanities' detractors, one that insists on their importance not only to what is most valuable in the West but to what the West most values.
However, if the humanities' best defence would reveal their indispensability to both the 'spirirual' and 'material' well-being of their societies, one must ask why they seem congenitally unable to convey this importance to these societies. In the second part of this essay, then, I want to examine one area of the humanities, literary studies and, in particular, contemporary literary studies and some of the antinomian gestures they have elaborated. For if the humanities can best defend themselves by showing themselves socially indispensable, it becomes self-defeating for them to strike antinomian stances that take the culture generallyincluding certain assumptions that antinomianism shares with that culture -as an enemy, to be undermined and called into question from the root. I will sketch a double and reciprocal pattern of 'bad faith': bad faith in the social attitude towards the humanities, and bad faith in the understanding some in the humanities have of their place in society.
But one must take seriously that humanities lament for themselves, for there is a sad old joke that some paranoiacs have real enemies. There are as many ways of taking the lament seriously as there are themes to lament. I want to consider a theme -fund-raising -that reveals a culture's attitude towards academic products with a precision an accountant can measure.
One may be forgiven for recalling the old joke when, in an article on a newly installed university president in Canada, one learns from someone knowledgeable about corporate opinion that when the 'private sector' supports universities it will 'look for a business school or something with practical, short-term payback. It's not going to fund the philosophy department' 74) .
This assessment of corporate policies on university support in Canada is in line with what Canadian university officials routinely report. Humanities departments at my own university heard the tale more than once during a recent fund-raising campaign. And when, on an airplane, I sat next to the principal fund-raiser of another Canadian university, he told me the same story, in almost the same words.
2 If the policy we are told guides corporate attitudes towards 'the philosophy department' is extended to all those humanities disciplines that provide little or no 'short-term payback,' it reveals another dimension of what, in management circles, is sometimes called a 'ten-minute time horizon.' For corporations that are unwilling to support such study and that live for short-term payback, it is as if all such disciplines are 'the philosophy department.' 'What's the good of this stuff?' these organizations seem to ask. What value is there in the study of poems and stories? Why worry about debates that go on from · century to century? What have Spinoza and Machiavelli or Rembrandt, Jane Austen and Bach to do with economic well-being? 'How,' ask many university administrators (infected with corporate enthusiasms) 'will such study generate research dollars? '3 Better to recast such questions while extending their logic with a thought experiment. Why not expunge art from the homes of the nation? Or cut from the fabric of national life all lyric and story, all meditation, past and present, on who we are, what we can hope for from life, how we should act, what we can know -and every reflection on them that has accrued over time? What problems did they solve? What information did they provide? What explanations did they offer?
Of course, if legislatures (dreaming of short-term payback) actually ordained such amputations, there would be street-riots. After all, Icorporate citizens' who may not wish to support 'the philosophy department' comprise individual citizens who sing songs, read novels, tell bedtime stories to their children, laugh and cry over their fate, wonder why this or that misery has befallen them and how they are to endure it, think about whether this or that politician will further social justice or preserve the national integrity, etc. As children, quarrelling over some injustice, they shouted, in a proto-humanities mood, to a parent or the child next door, 'It's not fair.' As adults, they are shocked by or in favour of abortion and may argue about it with reasons that refer to 'freedom,' 'rights,' conceptions of the self (where did these originate?), God and noGod. It .is true that poetry is not widely read in this century, but to deprive North Americans, who spend billions of dollars on the songs of pop culture's troubadours, of'lyric' would be political suicide. And, this evening, when the sun sets over North America, the blue lights of 'prime time' will flicker out stories for millions of narrative a.ddicts, many of them members of the corporate elite. These needs for song, narrative, principles~ conceptions of self, etc -whether in 'elite' or 'popular' forms -are what corporate citizens have in common with their existential selves, their fellow citizens, and their ancestors, as far back as cave and veldt. 4 So how can it be that corporate citizens, unlike individual citizens, may think 'the philosophy department' has no claim on their support? Perhaps they assume that the philosophy department is an outlet for the vague reveries of idle hours or a 'luxury' supported by life's more serious enterprises. And if it be the reverse? If the 'luxury' be· the existence of societies in which corporations can thrive?
Here is Ortega y Gasset, in The Revolt of the Masses, writing of the special danger of what he calls mass-man (the chances are fifty-fifty that a mass-man will be female):
Civilisation is not 'just there,' it is not self supporting. It is artificial and requires the artist or the artisan. If you want to make use of the advantages of civilisation, but are not prepared to concern yourself with the upholding of civilisation -you are done. In a trice you find yourself left without civilisation. Just a slip, and when you look around everything has vanished into air. (88) Found at all levels of society and throughout its institutions, mass-man makes use of civilization on the assumption that it is 'just there' and 'selfsupporting.' He assumes that the Western culture in which democracy, science, and industry flourish is not a 'culture' at all, something produced by long and arduous labour, but is, instead, something 'produced by nature':
For, in fact, the common man finding himself in a world so excellent, technically and socially, believes that it has been produced by nature, and never thinks of the personal efforts of highly-endowed individuals which the creation of this new world presupposed. Still less will he admit the notion that all these facilities still require the support of certain difficult human virtues, the least failure of which would cause the rapid disappearance of the whole magnificent edifice. (Ortega, 58)5 Indifferent to all that has gone into the making of his culture, and defined by what Ortega calls 'radical ingratitude towards all that has made possible the ease of his existence' (58), mass-man feels no more obligation to this culture for what it provides than to the sun for warmth. In effect, mass-man turns his back on the centuries of cultural labour that went into the creation of liberal democracy and into preparing the conditions under which science and industry could arise and flourish. That these cultural achievements may have been built on conceptions of what human beings are, of what they can know, of what they should do, and of what they may hope' for from life (including social and political life) is 0f no interest to him. For convenience's sake we can say that these conceptions reflect ongoing debates that have their sources in three ancient cities: Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome.
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But for mass-man these are unreal cities of bygone times. This man of the moment, whose digital watch records the present instant, thinks we somehow stumbled into modernization and science in the Renaissance and that science, business, and tedmology will flourish no matter what conceptions of selfhood, society, human rights, obligation, etc, prevail. The industrial revolution, democracy, and the information revolutionthey, too, just happened. For mass-man, these lucky breaks of Western history -unrelated to anything that went before, guaranteed to survive whatever may be coming -are without reference to the concerns of the diSciplines comprising the 'philosophy department.' What mass-man does not understand is that science, technical advance, and all those humanities concerns that quietly underwrite liberal democracy may reciprocally support one another -and that, if this be so, the cultures that gave birth to them, that took so long to create, and that require so much tact and care to maintain might suffer from his radical ingratitude. He does not recognize the degree to which scientific and technical advance may depend on the stabilities and the dynamism generated by political systems that incarnate in the everyday life of nations much of their philosophical, religious, and artistic heritage.
7 Systems in which majorities agree not to tyrannize over minorities -indeed, in which minorities may even counter the will of the majority. Systems of government in which peaceful transfers of power are possible because of a form of political generosity -the political equivalent of a high wire walk -that took millennia to conceive and implement. Systems of government, in short, which turn on what an American document (of European and Near Eastern pedigree) calls 'inalienable rights' (Kolakowski, 29, 146) .
The conceptions of selfhood and society that sustain those rights and the systems of government with which they are bound up cannot be effaced by some untutored act of abstraction from the cultural history that gave us modernity. It would be a foolish person indeed who thought we could now forget that history without consequence. To assume there might be serious consequence is the attitude of the prudent empiricist. To assume that there would be no consequence requires an adventurous turn of mind.
Nevertheless, in Ortega's words, mass-man is not interested in the principles of civilisation. Not of this or that civilisation but ... of any civilisation. Of course, he is interested in anesthetics, motor-cars, and a few other things. But this fact merely confirms his fund amental lack of interest in civilisation. For those things are merely its products, and the fervour with which he greets them only brings into stronger relief his indifference to the principles from which they spring. (81) Ortega does not suggest that academic clerics serve as arbiters of 'value/ confessors to the nations, or pious reconcilers of cultural heritages. No Luddite, hostile to industry and science, he is also careful not to equate 'mass-man' with 'working classes' or 'poor ' (13, 15-16) . Although his writing is marked by an elitist and 'conservative' hauteur and by an austere conception of authority that would be unacceptable these days , Ortega writes in defence of liberal democracy and against the communism and fascism of his time. B What gives The Revolt of the Masses a claim on OUf attention is its insistence that the science and technology we properly value in modernity are part of what I will call a cultural package deal. By this I mean that they did not arise out of some autonomous tradition of 'practical' progress but, rather, are so bound up with the arts and the humanities that to be indifferent to the latter is to imperil the former. ~as any thought been given,' Ortega asks, 'to the number of things that must remain active in men's souls in order that there may still continue to be "men of science" in real truth? Is it seriously thought that as long as there are dollars there will be science? This notion in which so many find rest is only a further proof of primitivism [Le., the belief in the "natural" development of modernity]' (84).
Indeed, Ortega really offers no 'defense of liberal education.' If anything, he may imply that it failed to anticipate that one day massman, the ungrateful inheritor of the civilization that the liberal arts helped make possible, might appear. Today, however, it is all too clear that massman is increasingly indifferent to such education. It is training that matters to what Ortega calls this 'spoiled child of history' -spoiled to the precise degree to which he is unaware of the package deal, of, that is, the 'numberless ingredients, of most disparate nature,' that must be 'brought together and shaken up in order to obtain the cocktail of physicochemical science'(84).9
Of philosophy itself, however, Ortega writes that it is 'an adventure of another order,' needing 'neither protection, attention nor sympathy from the masses. It maintains its character of complete inutility, and thereby frees itself from all subservience to the average man' (86). Its very 'inutility' keeps it free. Ortega's point may, again, be extended to any of the disciplines that lack instrumental 'utility' (including countless exercises in free and disinterested scientific research). Unfortunately, however, Ortega does not notice that inutility may also provoke the 'average man' by establishing a kind of dialectical distance from daily concerns. Not only does it provide the space for the sort of any thinggoes scientific questioning of nature that may one day lead a culture into modernization, but it may also provide the space for an any thinggoes criticism of the prevailing culture. This too is part of the package deal.
And yet who can say that this critical attitude had no role to play in the development of the societies in which democracy, industry, and science have flourished? Or that criticism of the culture and 'criticism' of nature are unrelated to each other? These are societies in which, in principle, evenjthing -not just ideas but ways of doing things -is open to question and in which, as a sign of this openness, the majority concedes to the minority a critical voice in the state, sharing its existence, as Ortega puts it, 'with the enemy.no
The West prides itself on its 'freedom/ it says. Since 1989 it has boasted of the advantage its freedoms gave it during the long competition with Marxist-Leninism. Although it is gratifying to see the collapse of totalitarianism in central and eastern Europe, an 'Ortegan' position would see in that collapse not some crude victory of 'capitalism' over 'communism' -as if cultural orders could be reduced to economics -but, rather, the decompression of societies that incorporated only parts of Western culture -industrialism, science, technique -while, thanks to a misbegotten Western creed, violating the terms of the package deal: no liberal democracy, no conceptions of human rights, hostility to art, OlWellian conceptions of truth, hostility to unfettered inquinJ. Those wretched economies, with their backward technology and fettered science, were not merely the results of a misguided preference for' command' over 'market' economies. They too formed a package.
If the liberal democracies triumphed because their rivals left out of account certain conceptions of what we can know, what we can hope, how we should act, and what we are, and if these increasingly massified liberal societies now congratulate themselves for possessing virtues shrunken, like Jivaro heads, to free-market slogans, then the losers may have taken the express route to a calamity the victors will reach at more leisurely pace.
Freedom in the marketplace and 'individual initiative' are not without relationship to other kinds of freedom, including 'dialectical distance' from everyday concerns. Ernest Gellner has recently described what it is like to live in a culture that preserves such a space: there are no privileged or a priori substantive truths. (This, at one fell swoop, eliminates the sacred from the world.) AU facts and all observers are equal. There are no privileged Sources or Affirmations, and all of them can be queried.
In inquiry, all facts and all features are separable: it is always proper to inquire whether combinations could not be other . than what had previously been supposed. In other words, the world does not arrive as a package ... but piecemeal. (Gellner, Postmodernism, 80) However, the 'Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism' that, in Gellner's account, gave us science and technology did not itself arrive as a brusque mutation in the seventeenth century. It is profoundly related to the world that took shape in Israel and Greece thousands of years ago.
It arrived, precisely, as a package deal.ll Nevertheless, when Gellner describes what this world feels like, he has it exactly right, for, in his Weberian idiom, this is a world that 'desacralizes' and 'disenchants ' 'everything' (81) .
It is the world of modem freedom, not only exhilarating but frightening. Perhaps it is safer merely to accept its material well-being while pretending, in acts of bad faith, that one can refuse its chilly climate that permits any thought, any inheritance, even the culture itself, to be weighed, measured, and found wanting. To live within that culture is to know its freedom as one's own. One is free to weigh and measure to the precise extent that what one cherishes can be weighed and measured by others. From Kierkegaard through Heidegger to Sartre there has been a famous meditation on the flight from the anxiety such freedom provokes.
Ortega seems unaware of how the coincidence of the useful and the useless (adumbrated throughout his book) invites ambiguous perception. Now, at a dinner party, in order to make a point, one reaches for a tool from a useless discipline: how wonderful to live in a free society where anything can be discussed at dinner! Now, feeling the tool used against oneself, one prefers to see the discipline from which it issues as 'impractical/ as if one's flourishing economy had been a contingency of history. Thus is the freedom of the entrepreneur decoupled from the useless freedom of the prophets, artists, and thinkers.
In the long run that freedom has proved all too useful -therefore it is potentially dangerous (everything open to judgment?), Every time he looks around himself, in those lucid moments that any conception of bad faith must postulate, mass-man -who in one breath says what in another breath he denies -must realize this. We can extend Ortega, then, by defining mass-man as a creature who cannot live with modem freedom. Despite the evidence of his senses, this pessimist assumes that in the long run freedom must go wrong. Not for nothing does he prefer short-term payback! To allow the 'useless' to wither is not necessarily a sign that one does not respect it.
By convincing himself that his culture is nature, mass-man has found a prophylactic against the anxiety caused by the cultural legacy that underwrites our desacralized and disenchanted culture. 12 The gaze he averts from the useless and the quest for the short-term payback become, then, forms of magical behaviour that, by the play of selective ignorance and selective attention, seek to ratify the nature of culture.
Moreover, mass-man is, after all, mass, existing in great numbers and often in positions of influence and power. It is not only CEO's who may insist on short-term payback. Government officials may include 'radical ingrates' who think the science they support is unrelated to anything else in the cultural heritage and that the societies they direct will flourish even if they turn their backs on the 'philosophy department.' Indeed, some members of university faculties and administrations, ' forgetful of what it is their duty to remember, may themselves succumb to radical ingratitude.
But there is worse. In Mr. Sammler's Planet (37-8), Saul Bellow, a novelist on whom Ortega's influence is apparent, has noted the extent to which world-historical intellectuals of our century have acted like spoiled children of history by insisting that because every cheque liberal democracy writes is not promptly cashed such societies are therefore hypocritical and must be destroyed. Intellectuals have their versions of the ten-minute time horizon. And thus arrives on the scene that enthusiast of modem freedom, the elite double of mass-man.
II
He had seen in Nancy a passion of the mind and will so pure that, as it swept through her, she could not believe that anything that opposed it required consideration.
Lionel Trilling, The Middle of the Journey A thrust at the uncaring and a warm toast to the poor 'philosophy department'! But why stop at a point that risks humanities self-congratulation? This would only suggest that 'hell is other people': business people, wealthy alumni, administrators, etc. In short: all the usual suspects -and alL we might be tempted stereotypically to believe, suffering (as usual) from mystified consciousness. It would thus raise a question the Grand Masters of ideological analysis never answered: if there be 'ideology,' understood as 'false consciousness,' a corruption of thought by one's material interests, how do the analysts of ideology (Marxists) escape it? 13 If there be something like the consciousness of mass-man, how do the humanities escape it? And, if they escape it, and if, in most universities of North America, departments of English, history, and philosophy still teach large numbers of students, why are the humanities unable to provide them with whatever protection against mass consciousness humanities intellectuals may have developed for themselves?14 If one is prepared to accept a notion of consciousness more clear to itself (that is, freer) than recent thinking has permitted, this puzzling 'escape' is more easily understood than in classical theories of ideology. A partial answer to the first question thus becomes: teachers in the humanities have a grimly obvious self-interest in seeing through spurious distinctions between the indispensably 'useful' and the luxuriously 'useless.' However, to recognize the usefulness of the useless is not in itself a sign that one is fully alert to the 'package deal,' and in an age of ideological analysis, it is puzzling tha t the second question is more difficult to answer than the first: why are humanities teachers unable to provide a kind of cultural prophylaxis against mass consciousness?
I have suggested that one of the signs of the mass-man is bad faith, a tendency to pretend to himself that he does not know what he knows all too well. In the heart of mass consciousness there is always a lucidity that mass-man passes over in silence and that contradicts the tenets of mass thought. We have already encountered bad faith. One 'believes' that philosophy is inconsequential -and then one raids it for its key terms. One pretends that art no longer matters -and then one tells a friend, 'Don't waste your money on that movie, but don't miss that other one.' One listens to music or sings when one is happy. Or reads Dickens or a techno-thriller. Or, each afternoon, one takes an electron bath in 'The Young and the Restless. '15 In fact, it may be easier to bring people to recognize such contradictions between belief and behaviour by appealing to their self-correctable reason than by haughtily diagnosing their 'false consciousness.,16 Both methods may arouse anxiety, but in the appeal to bad faith one need identify a mere contradiction -not be standing on an Archimedean point located outside the dialectic of false consciousness. By assuming that consciousness has some hope of self-correction, one avoids that pathos of ideology where we imagine other people to be dependent variables of economic forces, epiphenomena of discursive forces, or fevers induced in matter by social arrangements.
More puzzling is the question of why mass consciousness is so widespread when so many of those who fall into it pass through humanities departments. Departments of English, philosophy, French, and history continue to teach many students (not all of them prisoners of 'distribution requirements'). Why, then, do the humanities seem marginal to the interests of many North Americans once they have left the university? Is it that many teachers of the humanities do not make sufficiently clear to their students the nature of the package deal? Or do many of these teachers pretend to themselves not to know what they know?
Teaching in the humanities is beyond the scope of a single essay, and, in any case, I am able only to discuss one humanities discipline: literary study. Moreover, that discipline comprises many kinds of teaching, including individual styles, sequestered in the mysteries of the classroom, where colleagues rarely observe one another's teaching. However, there are matters of substance, bearing on the more public ways in which critics think of literature and suggest, implicitly or explicitly, how it should be taught.
I would like to discuss two of the latter, for each was intended to improve the teaching of literature by improving literary criticism. The first is broadly associated with the 'New Criticism,' and its relevance is owing to the role it played as a priest -grown old and feeble in the sacred wood of the university -who had to be slain by a young and vigorous successor. The latter and contemporary way of teaching and writing about literature -prominent since the 19705 and associated with what is often called 'theory' -is my principal concern.
Each movement attempted to make its students realize the importance of literature and of the humanities. Each has been of major influence on the teaching of English literature, often the most widely studied humanities discipline. (Crews, 128) . The sources of this North American concern with politics can be traced to French thought, from Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault back to the post-war Sartre and Beauvoir of 'committed literature.' Of course, recent theory takes many forms, and it is impossible here to do justice to its diversity. For example, because of its austere concern with rhetoric and representation, the huge influence of Derrida that issued in American 'deconstruction' has at times been accused of indifference to politics (Eagleton, 40; Lentricchia, (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) . If correct this is beside the point, for in the Derridean challenge to Western quests for 'foundations' to knowledge and representation there is an inevitable and powerful 'political' usefulness. If, for example, someone who relies on classic notions of truth, reason, and logic is incautious enough to challenge some explicitly political fonn of theory, deconstructive thought can be deployed against the challenger, as, when its tenets were under attack, British 'ordinary language philosophy' deployed a logical positivism that it claimed to have superseded (Gellner, Words, 119) .
Undoubtedly, however, some of the recent complaints about 'politicized criticism' are justified in virtue of the search of some North American critics and teachers for literary support of their political views. When Gerald Graff writes that 'I doubt whether the curriculum (as opposed to my particular courses) can or should become an extension of the politics of the left' (emphasis added), one notes the parenthetical admission that Graff's students may have to concern themselves not only with the implicit politics that inevitably influence any teacher's thinking but also with his explicit political opinions ('Storm, . Of course, one accepts Graff's comment that he does not approve 'of teachers who force students to conform to their political views.' Nevertheless, there is reason for caution: there are many teachers. And there are many students who, noticing the 'extension' of a political agenda, may be naIve interpreters of what does and does not count as 'forcing' them to 'conform' to that agenda. One recalls an old warning, from another academic world: 'But the true teacher will beware of imposing from the platform any political position upon the student, whether it is expressed or suggested' (Weber, 146 Ar,",,",,c',,," say, Foucault become parodically 'academic' when the Foucauldian idiom in which they thrive is borrowed by professors of more conventional sensibility. What is admirable is that contemporary theorists have complicated the agenda of criticism by opening the doors between disciplines that New Criticism had closed. What is disheartening is that some of them have learned little from the New Critics whom they slew with a Gallic sword. Critics and teachers could do a lot worse than to make their work, perhaps even their politicS, profit from the example of the archetypal literary text postulated by New Criticism: one that balanced its contraries, that did not congratulate itself for its political and social views, and that attained its 'disinterested' (or 'auto-telic') status not by having no position but by its tense articulation of multiple positions in a structure in which powerful rival views were on display.
This is the lesson of Matthew Arnold's unfashionable 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.' This is not to say that Arnoldian 'disinterestedness' meant that one should have no position (Arnold have no position?) but that there is something vulgar -mass -in believing one's own position to be so secure that no view antipodal to it can be maintained with a straight face. This is why Arnold criticized the great reviews of his time. With their supremely self-assured challenges to other magazines, they had become little more than mouthpieces for factions. 20 Moreover, as Weber reminds us, it is not only the critic but also the teacher who needs to recall the lesson of the other opinion:
The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize 'inconvenient' facts -I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions. And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others. I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intell~ctual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts. (Weber, 147, emphasis added) And in the famous Sartrean slogan that one should think against oneself, there is also Amoldian or Weberian truth (that Sartre thought this meant thinking only to the left of himself does not invalidate the principle). In any case, neither Arnold's, nor Weber's, nor Sartre's views prevent the teacher from leading students to see what is sociopolitically inconvenient for them. What they may, perhaps, demand as a sign of pedagogical good faith is that student and teacher, reader and critic, suffer alike in inconvenience. Is this not, finally, also the premise of Heideggerian 'reflection' (Besinnung): 'Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question' (Heidegger, 116 ). Heidegger does not mean that we keep this reflection a secret from reader and student.
To a journalist's objection that 'values are being taught [in American universities] "that are almost a reverse image of the American main-stream,'" Gerald Graff responds that this 'sounds shocking until one reflects that ... challenges to the "American mainstream" are precisely what would reasonably be expected in a good teacher' (Graff, Beyond, 157 ). Graff's reply is a classical instance of antinomian sentimentality. There is no necessary virtue in challenging the 'American mainstream.' The water may, indeed, need to be probed for impurities just downstream, but right where one is standing at the moment it may be perfectly potable. Moreover, because challenges to the mainstream move us to the deep heart's core, the assumption that they are always justified may be another of those 'presuppositions' of 'our own' most in need of an occasional, public, bath in the acids of what Heidegger calls 'reflection' and what the American mainstream may call 'keeping the teacher honest. ' To assume, then, that because no one can be disinterested (as an oak tree is an oak tree) one's pedagogical duty must therefore be to advance the politics of 'left' or 'right,' as if teaching did not also entail teaching against oneself, recalls what Ortega called the 'hennetism' of mass-man, the refusal of the intellectual recluse to compare himself with others; for 'To compare himself would mean to go out of himself for a moment and to transfer himself to his neighbour' (69). This indifference towards truth -for this is what hermetism is -permits mass-man to live not in the pursuit of truth but in the assertion of his own opinion. 21 It is the attitude of a 'type of man who does not want to give reasons or to be right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his opinions.' 'Hence,' Ortega adds, 'the Jln ew thing" in Europe is "to have done with discussions," and detestation is expressed for all forms of intercommunion which imply acceptance of objective standards' (73-4). In the contemporary academy such an attitude is easy prey for the argument, powerfully influential on certain forms of 'political' teaching, that 'claims of disinterest, objectivity, and universality are not to be trusted and themselves tend to reflect historical conditions' (quoted in Searle, 39).
Mass-man thinks that culture is nature, but his elite double knows that most of what we think natural is really cultural. In fact, he sometimes enjoys arguing that 'nature' itself is a 'cultural' invention. But what massman's cultivated double may forget is that the societies that permit him to celebrate the priority of culture over nature 'always already' thrive on conceptions of what we can know, what we may hope, how we should act, and what as human beings we are that do not arise from notions that truth, hived with self-interest aild in flight from 'objectivity,' is not true or that it is merely the Higher Opinion and (flying a Nietzschean flag) that the strongest will-ta-opinion -wins. 22 Thus, like the mass mass-man, his elite double is a sceptic. Where the former (sensing the appearance of an inconvenient argument) may say Well, everyone is entitled to his own opinion/ the latter seeks to reveal how deeply compromised ideals of objectivity and disinterestedness are by the political interests of those who propound them. This cultural equivalent to short-term payback seeks in the politicized classrooms of century's end what Ortega called an aim of 1920s mass-man, 'direct action.' Once one becomes eager to 'extend' one's politics to the classroom, hermetic notions of truth become attractive, for they absolve one of the need to think against the politics one wishes to extend. One may then correct a previous generation's failure to rentind its students of the political debates circulating in a text by understanding such debates (and the 'failures' of one's predecessors) as networks of ideology -with the identification of other people's ideology becoming the last disinterested, objective, and universal insight. 23 The self-refuting notions of truth in the humanities today resemble those mass acts of bad faith in which one dismisses art only to reveal that one could not live without it. Ortega describes mass-man as a 'satisfied man,' ~characterized by his "knowing" that certain things cannot be, and nevertheless, for that very reason, pretending in act and word to be convinced of the opposite .... For the tonic that keeps the mass-man in form is insincerity, lithe joke." All his actions are devoid of the note of inevitability, they are done as the fils de famille carries out his escapades' (104-5). At the level of ideas, the equivalent of the joke is the selfrefuting idea. Or, if you prefer, today many people say things they can't really believe.
The opening pages of Frank Lentricchia's Criticism and Social Change, an influential celebration of the need to make literary criticism and the teaching of literature politically ~oppositional,' are punctuated by such self-refuting notions of truth. Lentricchia is properly unhappy about the condition of the humanities and about the feeling of many 'literary intellectuals' that their teaching and writing are not part of the 'real world' (6-7) and that they are 'vaguely out of it' (51). Anxious to distinguish his critical 'praxis' from 'the usual critical lyricism that would deny the sodal text power and social specificity in the name of I/literature" , (11), Lentricchia urges a position that verges on the unintelligible. 24 Eager to provide literary intellectuals with a socially valuable role by keeping what he calls ~Marxist literary theory' current, and yet aware, too, of the difficulties standing in the way of acceptance of the 'teleological drift' of Marxist historicism, he constructs a collage of pragmatism, Foucault, Kenneth Burke, and a marvellous variation on an old Marxist routine of distinguishing 'sophisticated' from 'vulgar' Marxisrns. Lentricchia has found the ultimate distinction: a 'sophisticated' Marxism is one that 'knows' it is untrue.
Franco-American deconstruction, he argues, makes it difficult to accept the 'epistemological claim that Marxist discourse on the historical process has a privileged episternic status, since [Marxism believes that only] a Marxist discourse can adequately represent the foundations of historical process. ' (12) . Here is an instance of what I noted earlier, where a critic dissociates himself from apolitical deconstruction but then uses it when convenient -here to deal with the various challenges to Marxism's credibility as a theory of historical development. Marxism may not be 'true,' but after deconstruction, what is?
Marxism does not, Lentricchia writes, have 'that sort of claim upon us' because 'I do not believe that Marxism or any other philosophy rests on the foundations of reality or history. In the old sense of the word, Marxism is not a "true" theory' (12). Of course, deconstruction does not prevent Frank Lentricchia from making truth-claims; if his sentence means anything, it means that Marxist accounts of capitalist society do nof 'correspond' ('in the old sense of the word') to 'reality':
Again, is Marx's picture 'true'? Does it 'correspond' to social reality? The answer is that, through an analysis of existing conditions, an analysis penetrated by an astonishingly powerful vision and rhetoric, Marx created a picture which Marxist and many non-Marxist intellectuals today in the West respond to as if it were true, as if in fact this is where we live, what our history at bottom is all about. Marx's picture ... is true not in the reflectionist terms in which it is often posed ... but in the pragmatist sense that it has put many intellectuals into active and rich commerce with their society. (13).
With quotation marks, he wants to make us share his anxiety about the classic terms of epistemology: knowledge, truth, correspondence, representation. However, 'social reality' is too important to allow its claim We can call this 'pragmatic self-refutation,' where the assertion of a position is the best counter-argument to its claim. However, since twenty years of identification of this error have had no effect on those who continue to make it, perhaps it can better be called the Higher Bad Faith. 25 Despite Lentricchia's claims about the revolutions that have overturned 'reflectionist' thought, everything happens in his argument 'as if,' in that revolutionary thought, nothing had happened. 26 He insists that 'there is no such thing as eternally "true Jl theory' but then adds that 'theories are generated only in history ... for the purpose of generating more history in a certain way: generating the history we want' (12). In short, this is how things are under the sun. It may not be true 'for eternity/ but it sounds as if he means it has been true for a very long time. 27 When he adds that his own 'historical claims make no traditional epistemological demand on my reader' (12), the long Marxist effort at truth-telling collapses into what Ortega calls an 'escapade,' or what Hegel, writing of the way in which scepticism's 'deeds and words always belie one another,' compares to the 'squabbling' of children (Hegel, 125) .
Criticism and teaching may contribute to massification in two ways. As in late forms of New Criticism, they may suggest that literature is pure discourse and that its study should not be sullied by the methods and concerns of other disciplines. Or, more recently, they may assume that literature is mere discourse -and,like all discourse, riddled with ideologies that must be decoded by the self-refuting methods of readers who manage to know what no one else can.
A teaching that does not make clear how deeply implicated art and philosophy are in creating and sustaining a culture that is both technicoscientific and liberal democratic may foster the notion that literary study is an exotic flower of the university, maintaining only distant relations with the other diSciplines in a faculty of arts and science, having little to do with the student's sociopolitical life, and offering little enlightenment about the cultural package deal. In its best students such teaching may ' foster a resentment of Western scientific, technical, and political traditions as alien forces, to which they are at best indifferent, at worst hostile. Among average students, it may contribute to the bafflement about art that lies behind its consignment to the entertainment pages of the ' weekend editions of the newspapers.
But a teaching that refuses to think fundamentally against itself and that seeks primarily to expose the hell that is other people will not reduce rnassification or avoid resentment merely by opening doors to other disciplines. A teachi!lg that cannot recall for its students, with a generosity that makes no demands on their political opinions, how deeply their culture depends on exercises in political generosity arising from conceptions of selfhood, knowledge, and hope to which the humanities have contributed has only itself to blame if, when they become alumni, they tum into radical ingrates.
Takes one to know one! The elite student, 'recruited' to the caste, may be all too eager to accept the teacher's offer of hostility to the culture generally. Ressentiment is an infectious disease. However, the typical student is not so readily inclined to dismiss democracies merely because all their cheques have not yet been cashed. One of the points of purchase the humanities may have on such students is, in fact, their almost prereflective endorsement of what they assume to be 'natural' societies; for what will surely jeopardize the societies they admire is precisely the indifference that mass consciousness maintains towards the package deal.
Since the nineteenth century, advanced humanistic consciousness has taken at least two major 'adversarial' attitudes towards its culture (Trilling, Beyond, xii-xiii) . From Poe, FIaubert, Mallarme, and others, it learned one fonn of otherness to its culture. Sartre called the quest of Flaubert and his literary heirs for the perfectly self enclosed book a dream of 'absolute art' (Sartre, 133fO . From F1aubert to some of those forms of postrhodernism and poststructuralism that have recently concerned Christopher Norris, we can trace a literary dream of textual selfenclosure. At one point in this century, that literature was paralleled by a criticism that sealed off the commentary on literature from infection by other disciplines. Later, absolute literature would be paralleled by an 'interdisciplinary' criticism that sometimes suggests the world is -like all those other disciplines -discourse or spectacle. To the extent that the world lacked the coherent plenitude of the absohlte text, then, for absolute art and its critical entourage, so much the worse for the world. In this tradition, the mystified world outside the text is, in Flaubert's word, b€tise. The job of the interpreter-teacher of absolute art becomes one of making its students realize that bourgeois culture is a historical enormity.
Issuing also from the nineteenth century is another adversarial form of absolute otherness. Where the tradition of absolute literature tries to create (or, in the 'dandy' or the 'cursed poet,' to make itself into) the absolutely other, the rival position points to an internal otherness. The world -still thoroughly bourgeois -thinks itself the agent of history. In fact, it is a dupe of the 'cunning of reason,' of 1the idea that reason and the rational society are actualized not through reason itself, but through its other, by "passion," i.e., without man's consciously willing it' (Ferry, 36 Long-absorbed into 'academic' fiction and criticism, these traditions betray the bad faith they share with mass-man, for neither has much use for the political culture that has made it possible for them to flourish. Each assumes that criticism of that culture must demoralize it, destroy it, or 'cure' it of itself. In its most extreme versions absolute literature (and its critical shadow) may even imagine it can get along without scientific and technical culture. The interpreters of the cunning of reason, on the other hand, have sometimes called themselves 'scientific,' but, in fact, where the proponents of the cunning of the political unconscious did achieve political success, both art and science suffered.
28 Each tradition sees 'mass culture' as bourgeois, stupid, corrupt -ill. Not for notrung does D.H. Lawrence's Rupert Birkin, in a Flaubertian mood in Women in Love, imagine the extinction of the human race. Or Marx imagine that the social order must undergo apocalyptic cleansing. Or Freud, the liberal democrat of the three, imagine civilization to be a thin crust over the chthonian fires of the unconscious.
In University Criticism, Inc, the powerful charisma of such prophetic visionaries risks diminishing into routinized denunciations-in-bad-faith of Western culture. Become routine, such denunciations, like the 'escapades' of the fils de lamille, are usually indulged by the rest of the family. These denunciations are in bad faith because the huge majority of those who make them do not really want (or, same thing, expect) cleansing fires to fall. But they teach and write in the denunciatory mode anyway. This results in part from a feeling that for criticism to be authentic and the humanities to be justified they must be absolutely other.
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Teachers of the (literary) humanities may fail, then, to make their disciplines seem integral to their societies to the extent that their students are led to perceive those diSciplines as -other. Of course, absolute otherness must not later object if it is consigned to the social and academic margins, underfunded and unrespected. Absolute critics can scarcely mind that they are not embraced by those whom they find repellent. Business people are not stupid. As one of them told me, ' We know what you tell them [students] about us.' Politicians are not stupid either. Nor any of the other participants in liberal democratic society who have not chosen the way of Flaubert or who do not -think they are the mystified or neurotic reflections of the forces of production or of the unconscious.
Neither of these approaches to teaching one of the humanities disciplines seems likely, then, to overcome the seductions of mass consciousness. One risks making its material seem icily aloof from the lifeexperience of students. The other, committed to recasting those life experiences that student-readers may think they find in literature as a play of politico-economic interests, risks advancing the modern tendency to 'decode,' infuriating those students who do not share the politics of the decoder, inspiring others to become decoders themselves, and suggesting to all that a truly important 'discourse' is necessarily alive with Jconcepts.' It will be said that to teach with a concern for the life-experience embodied in literature and for its relationship to that of the students is precisely what is accomplished when the teacher 'extends' his political views into the classroom. This is unconvincing and smacks of cant. A teaching that wants to undo the work of rnassification cannot afford to be so lacking in the generosity necessary to respect the freedom of the student. Nor is there any evidence that partisan teaching (or 'New Critical' teaching) has slowed the progress of mass consciousness by making it see that literature not only addresses the life-experiences of those who study it but that it is essential to the cultural bargain that made modernization and the critical reflection on it possible. Much turns here, of course, on the extent to which humanities intellectuals find in modernization anything to admire.
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To suggest that the experience that issued in the modernization of the West may include much that demands respect and admiration neither denigrates nor marginalizes other cultures. Nor does it deny that those other cultures suffered exploitation at the hands of the West. It merely reminds us that to allow our politics to make us fail to try, at least, to see that culture as in itself it really is (beauty-marks and warts) -whether we do so as members of an academic caste, a political caste, or a corporate caste -is to run certain risks. This is the culture whose members engage in auto-critique by inverting hierarchies and by comparing their culture to other cultures -sometimes to its advantage, sometimes at its expense, but, in classic fonn, by recourse to a non-hermetic conception of truth, out in the open, in a clearing, where opponents are free to advance counter-arguments. 'Opposition is true friendship.' It is the culture that generated an extraordinary system of science, industry, liberal democracy, and technology. It is the culture that can afford such luxuries because, long ago, its 'philosophy department' invested in modernization. NOTES 1 I am unable to take up the question here of the extent to which these traditions have had extra-academic sources. Obviously, Romanticism, Marxism, and existentialism were scarcely academic phenomena. 2 That it is not a narrowly Canadian story may be inferred from a 1991 announcement of a conference on 'Fund Raising in the Arts and Humanities.' The panel included representatives from the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Endowment for the Arts ('Dispelling Fears,' Chronicle of Higher Education) . Henry Rosovsky, speaking of a disparity between what he calls the 'two lifestyles and living standards' among arts and science disciplines at Harvard, remarks that 'The simple fact is that some skills or occupations command higher salaries and receive a larger share of public and private resources' (223). 3 Of course, the point implied here can be made for many of the social science disciplines and for those areas of research in the natural sciences in which utility is hard to find (Rosovsky, 222n9) . However, such general problems are posed most clearly in the humanities, and whatever justification may be made for the latter can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to other 'impractical' disciplines. Moreover, the relative difficulty the humanities normally face in finding external support suggests that in the course of the present crisis their relative disadvantages will have increased. studies' to ask their students to study Romantic poetry, it is impossible to conceive of 'environmentalism' -and its infrastructure of scientific support -apart from the network of religious, philosophical, and artistic concerns with 'nature' disseminated since the rise of Romanticism and often apparent in environmentalist creeds. For a philosophical account of how that 'network' may have also contributed to environmental degradation, see Zimmerman, . B When, in a passage I earlier quoted, Ortega speaks of our 'excellent' societies, he does not mean that they are without flaw or that they embody all the principles they celebrate. This 'excellence' must be seen against the background of the social alternatives on the scene at any given time. 9 Counter-indifference to or contempt for 'training' would, however, miss the point completely and would merely turn mass-man's outlook inside out. 10 The critical attitude of the humanities is not without its own relationship to the cultural conditions that created early capitalism's entrepreneurs, with their habit of 'going out to seek new opportunities and try out new courses of action without the constraints of collective traditions, customs, and tabus' (Berger, 107) . See also Kolakowski. 11 Many of the 'postmodemists' whose 'relativism' Gellner deplores know this very well-thus, in the tradition that runs from Heidegger through Derrida, the critique of 'logocentrism' and of the 'Greek father,' D.H. Lawrence, an earlier critic of logocentrism, also recognized this in his preference for Etruscans over Romans. 12 For example, he may fear that the endless questioning that arises from within the useless disciplines will never stop generating crises of legitimacy for him by promoting new classes of marginalized people into the culture. Of course, it is one of the assumptions of Enlightenment that the application of reason will, indeed, foster freedom by overcoming the constraints of narure. 13 'The Marxist scenario of class struggle was never able to account for itself, for those who produced the scenario, for Marx and Engels themselves. Where did the theorists of this class struggle fit into the supposed cleavage between proletariat and capitalist class? When the question is raised, there is only embarrassment covered over by a silence' (Gouldner, 9, his emphasis). For precisely the same reason Marxism's notion of 'false consciousness' no longer seems useful, and one is increasingly tempted to wonder if something corresponding to it ever existed. 14 I do not suggest that such an 'escape' is specific to humanities intellectuals.
They may have a special interest that helps them resist it, but awareness of the 'package deal' is, of course, not restricted to the humanities -or to university people. 15 Narrative is doing better than ever. To concede a need for techno-thrillers or
The Young and the Restless' is to concede a need for narrative in principle.
It should not add heat to the debate about what belongs in the canon to say that obtaining the consent of a Tom Clancy reader to this 'in principle' is the first step in leading him or her to consider reading more than technothrillers. 16 'Philosophy teachers are teachers, that is, intellectuals employed in a given education system and subject to that system, performing, as a mass, the social function of inculcating the "values of the ruling ideology." ... Philosophers are intellectuals and therefore petty bourgeois, subject as a mass to bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology' (Althusser, . Althusser was once famous for offering a more 'sophisticated' Marxist conception of ideology than this one. This is not the place for a discussion of the concept of ideology, but it is always important to look beneath every 'sophisticated' Marxist account of ideology for the 'vulgar' safety-net of 'false consciousness.' For a discussion of Althusser' 5 way of sparing people like himself from his 'therefore,' see Ferry and Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties, 5. 17 Anyone who works in a literature department in a North American university will be aware of the widespread concern with 'the politics of literature.' However, people who work outside the university or academics who work in other disciplines may be suspicious of journalistic allegations. They can obtain some idea of the scope of humanities political concerns by examining three 'special issues' of literary journals. See The Politics of Critical Language, The Politics of Interpretation, The Politics of Teaching Literature. 18 The 'scholar,' the 'New Critic' and the 'theorist' are, of course, ideal types.
New Critics were never so foolish as entirely to banish from their teaching or their criticism scholarship, politics, psychology, etc. And when faced with students whose 'watching' skills exceed their reading skills, 'theorists' must fall back on the pedagogical techniques that are the great legacy of New Criticism.
to the 'rhetorical process' he offers as the tool to advance his politics seem to be an 'unfree' 'foundationalist' theory or the 'violent coercion' that comes of mixing 
